Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies

Title:                      Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies

Author:                 Raymond J. Batvinis

Batvinis, Raymond J. (2014). Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage During World War II. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas

LCCN:    2013046775

D810.S7 B352 2014

Subjects

Date Updated:  March 30, 2015

Review by Joseph C. Goulden.[1]

An oft-told story in the annals of intelligence is that of the rivalry of the FBI’s J. Edgar Hoover with William Donovan of the Office of Strategic Services over which agency should have wartime primacy in the fight against the Axis powers. However, an overlooked principal in the fight was none other than MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. As retired FBI executive Raymond Batvinis relates in engrossing detail, the Brits chose to align themselves with Donovan, realizing that he had considerably more clout with President Roosevelt than did Hoover. Indeed, in the pre-war years, the British were bold enough to set up their own shadow intelligence service in the United States, British Security Coordination, whose functions paralleled those of the FBI in many respects. To the British, the FBI was a police agency, interested in imprisoning spies rather than using them to feed disinformation back to Berlin, as did MI6.

In due course, peace was made. The OSS emerged with prime responsibility for foreign intelligence, but the FBI had an overseas presence through agents posted to American embassies as “legal attaches.”

Drawing upon previously classified documents, Mr. Batvinis describes how the FBI joined with MI6 in the so-called “Double Cross” operation to funnel false information back to the enemy through agents who were caught and “turned.” The bureau’s target audience was Japan, which was fed a flood of bogus “information” on subjects ranging from the growth of US military prowess to intended invasion targets. I had not encountered a full description of the bureau’s work on “Double Cross” until Mr. Batvinis’ book.

Another FBI coup, according to Mr. Batvinis, was the “chilling revelation,” detected in December 1941, about German eagerness for information concerning American atomic research. FBI intelligence led to Roosevelt’s decision to fund the development of nuclear weaponry.

The FBI managed to con the Germans into sending vast sums to agents who had been doubled into working for the Allies. (The agents would claim that they could not spy and hold a job at the same time,) One of them alone received $46,875 over a two-year period—more than $612,000 in 2012 dollars.

Another deception swallowed by the Germans was the creation of bogus subagents who supposedly had access to information sought by Berlin. These notional sources were essential to convincing Berlin that the prime agent had access to multiple sources—including a War Department employee and workers in such places at the Brooklyn Navy Yard and Republic Aviation Co.

For communications, the FBI set up a transmitter in a rambling farmhouse in a remote area on the north shore of Long Island. A “large snarling dog” discouraged visits from curious locals.

Mr. Batvinis’ book is a splendid account of the FBI’s contribution to victory in World War II. Five cloaks, five daggers.

Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake[2]

During the 1930s, Nazi Germany recruited a number of spies in the United States. By 1940, the FBI had established a domestic counterintelligence capability and a limited foreign intelligence role focused on that threat. Former FBI special agent Ray Batvinis told that story in his first book, The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence[3]. That: book did not consider the FBI’s intelligence contribution to WWII, but Hoover’ Secret War Against Axis Spies deals with it at length. In Batvinis’ view; his book is “not a story international competition,” but it comes close.”(p. 3)

For the 18 months preceding 7 December 1941, the FBI’s relationship with British intelligence in America—designated British Security Coordination (BSC}—was fruitfully cooperative. Headed by William Stevenson, the BSC included members of MI6, MI5, and the Special Operations Executive. But as William Donovan worked—with supportfrcim Stevenson—to create an independent foreign intelligence service, “a complicated (and poisonous) relationship between Hoover and William Stevenson” developed. One complication was the Bureau’s view that the BSC had begun running unilateral operations in the United States; this was Hoover’s domain, and he reacted aggressively—with mixed results—to limit the BSC to liaison status. (pp. 3-4) But once the United States became belligerent, the British recognized “improved sharing relationships with the FBI” (p. 43) would be essential, and Hoover likewise took steps to make the FBI an operational player. Batvinis tells how Hoover did it.

Taking advantage of the FBI’s foreign intelligence responsibilities in Latin America and its domestic counterintelligence mission, Hoover demanded that the British work through the Bureau when their agents entered North or South America. The TRICYCLE double agent case is a good example. When the BSC proved less than responsive to Bureau requests, Hoover sent “legal attaches” to London for direct liaison with MI5, MI6, and Bletchley Park. As a result, “valuable information concerning espionage, sabotage, controlled enemy agents, [and] Double Cross techniques … began flowing to Washington.” (p. 90)

Batvinis covers each of these topics in varying detail. He gives detailed attention to the FBI handling of its own German double agents as part of the British Double Cross deception system and the anticipated operations against Japan. The Bureau had to manage acquisition of the planted information and its communication to the Abwehr. Of equal interest is how the FBI arranged to receive Bletchley Park decrypts—code-named OSTRICH—that mentioned anything in the Western Hemisphere.

Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies adds a new dimension of operational detail to the FBI’s role in WWII, but he does not cover Soviet espionage in war-time America. That will be the subject of Batvinis’ next study.

[1] Joseph C. Goulden, “The Latest Intelligence Books, Intelligencer: Journal of U. S. Intelligence Studies, 20, 3 (Spring/Summer 2014). Joseph C. Goulden is the author of 18 nonfiction books. A Chinese-language edition of his 1982 book, Ko rea: The Untold Story of the War, is being published in August by Beijing Xiron Books. Goulden is a long-time reviewer of espionage and spy books for The Washington Times, for AFIO’s Intelligencer, and other publications. Most of the reviews in the Intelligencer appeared in prior editions of The Washington Times or The Washington Lawyer [D.C. Bar Association] and are reprinted in the Intelligencer by permission of the author. Joe Goulden’s most recent book is The Dictionary of Espionage: Spyspeak Into English (Dover Publications, 2012)

[2] Hayden B. Peake in the Intelligencer (21, 1, Winter 2014-15, pp. 125-126). Hayden Peake is the Curator of the CIA’s Historical Intelligence Collection. He has served in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations. Most of these reviews appeared in recent unclassified editions of CIA’s Studies in Intelligence. These and many other reviews and articles may be found on line at http://www.cia,gov.

[3] Batvinis, Raymond J. (2007). The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas

 

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